Introduction
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 makes it illegal to buy or sell a kidney in the US, thus making donation the only viable option for kidney transplantation. A transplanted kidney from a live donor survives significantly longer than one from a deceased donor (see e.g. Mandal et al. 2003 ). Hence, live donation is always the first choice for a patient. Moreover, there is a significant shortage of deceased donor kidneys.
1 There are two kidneys in the human body. One healthy kidney is more than enough for its healthy functioning. Since the risks associated with donation surgery and follow-up have decreased with the advancement of new medical and surgical techniques, live donation has been the increasing source of overall donations. Usually, a live donor is a relative or friend of the recipient and is willing to donate only if that particular recipient is going to receive a transplant. That is, she is a directed live donor. However, a recipient is often unable to receive a willing live-donor's kidney because of blood-type incompatibility or antibodies to one of the donor's proteins (aka a positive crossmatch). Medical doctor F. T. Rapaport (1986) proposed live-donor paired kidney exchanges between two such incompatible recipient-donor pairs: the donor in each pair gives a kidney to the other pair's compatible recipient.
2 exchanges with many recipient-donor pairs.
Another controversial issue in the market design for kidney exchange concerns the preferences of recipients over kidneys. A respected assumption in the field is that all compatible live-donor kidneys have the same likelihood of survival, following Gjertson and Cecka (2000) , who statistically show this in their data set (see also Delmonico 2004 ).
Medical doctors also point out that if the paired-donor is compatible with the recipient, the latter will directly receive a kidney from her paired-donor and will not participate in the exchange.
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These institutional restrictions limit the applicability of the TTCC mechanism, which uses strict preferences information, opts in compatible pairs to the system, and results in possibly arbitrary lengths of exchange cycles. Thus, it is not immediately practical to implement this mechanism in the field.
Based on these restrictions, Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2005a) focused on exchanges consisting of two pairs, assuming recipients are indifferent among all compatible donors. They proposed two mechanisms, a priority mechanism and an egalitarian mechanism for strategy-proof and Paretoefficient exchanges when recipients are indifferent among compatible donors.
The New England Program for Kidney Exchange (NEPKE) is the first US kidney exchange
program that started to implement mechanisms for kidney exchange, and , which adopted a similar algorithm due to Edmonds (1965) as proposed by Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2005a) .
However, there was a significant gap between theory and implementation. Two-way exchanges were clearly the cornerstone of the kidney exchange paradigm. However, it was not clear what society at large was losing by restricting exchanges to two-way. Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2007) showed that in a large population, all the gains from exchange can be obtained by using 2&3&4-way exchanges. Especially, 2&3-way exchanges capture almost all the gains from exchange, and the marginal contribution of 3-way exchanges is significantly large. Thus, going from 2-way to 2&3-way exchanges nearly captures all the gains from exchange.
7 This is a controversial point. Using European data, Opelz (1997) shows that indeed tissue-type matching matters even in living donations. Thus, there is no consensus in the medical community regarding tissue-type matching matters for long-term survival of live donor kidneys (other than immediate rejection). Of course, there are certain properties of donors that all authors agree as important, such as the age and health of the donor. Following the field practice of live donation established, the models and field applications surveyed here do not directly take these points into consideration, other than the ability of a recipient to report her willingness to receive or not to receive a compatible kidney.
Based on these observations, NEPKE started to implement a priority mechanism that could induce up to four-way exchanges.
In 2005, the Ohio-based Alliance for Paired Donation (APD) 8 was established through the collaboration of surgeon Michael Rees, computer programmer Jon Kopke, Alvin Roth, and the authors.
This program immediately started to implement a mechanism based on maximizing the number of patients to be matched through up to four-way exchanges. It uses a priority-based solution in case there is more than one maximal matching.
The establishment of a national program for kidney exchange is in progress. The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), the contractor for the national organization that maintains the deceased-donor waiting list, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), is developing this program with the consultation of economists, computer scientists, medical doctors, and administrators who have worked on the development and in the executive body of the exchange programs mentioned here and some other independent organizations. In late 2010, they launched a pilot program and two match runs have already been concluded.
In this survey, we will summarize the works of Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2005a , 2007 , which we mentioned above, andÜnver (2010) . The latter of these three studies extends the agenda of the first two papers and analyzes the kidney exchange problem as a dynamic problem in which patients arrive over time under a stochastic distribution. Then it proposes efficient mechanisms that maximize the total discounted number of patients matched under different institutional restrictions.
We will also discuss computational issues involved in solving the optimization problems with the mechanism design approach. Finally, we will talk about other paradigms in kidney exchange that are in implementation such as list exchange, altruistic donor exchange, and altruistic donor chains, and how these are incorporated in the market design paradigm.
Mechanics of Donation
In this section, we summarize the mechanics governing kidney donations. There are two sources of donation: deceased donors and living donors.
In the US and Europe a centralized priority mechanism is used for the allocation of deceased donor kidneys, which are considered social endowments. There have been studies regarding the effect of the choice of priority mechanism on efficiency, equity, and incentives, starting with Zenios a soft opt-in system is used to recruit such donors. On their drivers' licences, candidates can opt in to be deceased donors, that is they give consent to have their organs be used for transplantation 8 www.paireddonation.org upon their death. However, upon their death their relatives can override this decision. There are also other regimes in practice around the world, such as hard opt-in, hard opt-out, and soft opt-out.
As mentioned, live donations have been an increasing source of donations in the last decade.
Live donors are generally significant others, family members, or friends of recipients. There are also some altruistic live donors who are kind enough to donate a kidney to a stranger. There is no single regulation governing live donations in the US. The only rule of thumb used is that live donors should not be coerced in donation through economic, psychological, or social pressure. In some countries, live donors are required to be blood-related or emotionally related (i.e., romantically related) to the recipient.
In this survey, we will deal with directed living donations, more specifically, the cases in which a living donor is willing to donate a kidney to a specific recipient but is incompatible with her intended recipient. We will also briefly comment on non-directed, i.e., altruistic, donations.
There are two tests that a donor must pass before she is deemed compatible with the recipient, blood compatibility and tissue compatibility, aka crossmatch, tests:
• Blood compatibility test: There are four human blood types, O, A, B, and AB. Blood type is determined by the existence or absence of one or two of the blood-type proteins called A and B. As a rule of thumb, a donor can donate a kidney to a recipient who has all the blood-type proteins that the donor possesses. 9 Thus:
-O blood-type kidneys are blood-type compatible with all recipients;
-A blood-type kidneys are blood-type compatible with A and AB blood-type recipients;
-B blood-type kidneys are blood-type compatible with B and AB blood-type recipients;
-AB blood-type kidneys are blood-type compatible with AB blood-type recipients.
• If either test fails, the donation cannot go forward. We refer to such a pair as incompatible.
This pair then becomes available for paired kidney exchange, which is the topic of the rest of the survey.
9 O type is referred to as 0 (zero) in many languages, and it refers to non-existence of any blood-type proteins.
A Model of Kidney Exchanges
Let N be the set of groups of incompatible donors and their recipients, that is: i . We permit each recipient to have more than one incompatible donor. However, only one of these donors will donate a kidney if, and only if, the recipient receives one. We will sometimes refer to i simply as a recipient, since we treat the donors through their kidneys, which are objects, and consider the recipients as the decision makers, i.e. agents.
For each i ∈ N , let i be a preference relation on N with three indifference classes. Option j ∈ N \ {i} refers to the recipient i receiving a kidney from the best donor of j for i. Option i refers to remaining unmatched. Let i be the acyclic (i.e., strict preference) portion of i and ∼ i be the cyclic (i.e., indifference) portion of i . For any j, k ∈ N \ {i}, we have
• j i i if at least one donor of j is compatible with i;
• j ∼ i k if at least one donor of each of j and k is compatible with i;
• i i j if all donors of j are incompatible with i; and
• j ∼ i k if all donors of j and k are incompatible with i.
That is, a recipient with a compatible donor is preferred by i to remaining unmatched, which is, in turn, preferred to a recipient with incompatible donors. All recipients with only incompatible donors are indifferent for i. Similarly, all recipients each with at least one compatible donor are indifferent for i.
A problem is denoted by the recipients, their donors and preferences. An outcome of a problem is a matching. A matching µ : N → N is a one-to-one and onto mapping. For each i ∈ N, recipient i 1 receives a kidney from some donor of recipient µ (i). We do not specify which donor in our notation, since at most one donor of a recipient is going make a donation in any matching. Thus, for our purposes i can be matched with any compatible donor of µ (i). A matching µ is individually rational if for all recipients i ∈ N , µ (i) i i. We will focus on only individually rational matchings.
Thus, when we say a matching it will be individually rational from now on. Let M be the set of matchings. A k−way exchange for some k ≥ 1 is a list (i 1 , i 2 , ..., i k ) such that i 1 receives a kidney from a compatible donor of i k , i 2 receives a kidney from a compatible donor of i 1 , ..., and i k receives a kidney from a compatible donor of i k−1 . Similarly, all exchanges we will consider will be individually rational. A degenerate exchange (i) denotes the case in which recipient i is unmatched.
Alternatively, we represent a matching µ as a set of exchanges such that each recipient participates in one and only one exchange. Besides deterministic outcomes, we will also define stochastic outcomes. A stochastic outcome is a lottery λ = (λ µ ) µ∈M that is a probability distribution on all matchings. Although in many matching problems, there is no natural definition of von Neumann -Morgenstern utility functions, there is one for this problem: It takes value 1 if the recipient is matched and 0 otherwise. We can define the (expected) utility of the recipient of a pair i under a lottery λ as the probability of the recipient getting a transplant and we denote it by u i (λ). The utility profile of lottery λ is denoted by u (λ) = (u i (λ)) i∈N .
A matching is Pareto-efficient if there is no other matching that makes every recipient weakly better off and some recipient strictly better off. A lottery is ex-post efficient if it gives positive weight to only Pareto-efficient matchings. A lottery is ex-ante efficient if there is no other lottery that makes every recipient weakly better off and some recipient strictly better off.
A mechanism is a systematic procedure that assigns a lottery for each problem.
A mechanism is strategy-proof if for each problem (N, ), it is a dominant strategy for each pair i
• to report its true preference i in a preference profile set P ( i ) where for all i ∈ P ( i ),
e. one pair can never report a group with only incompatible donors as compatible; and
• to report full set of incompatible donors to the problem.
The first bullet point above underlines the fact that it is possible to detect incompatible donors through blood tests, thus, we will assume that no recipient can reveal an incompatible donor to be compatible. On the other hand, some idiosyncratic factors can lead a recipient to reveal compatible donors to be incompatible.
We will survey different Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for different institutional constraints.
Two-way Kidney Exchanges
First, we restrict our attention in this section to individually rational two-way exchanges. This section follows Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2005a) . Formally, for given any problem (N, ), we are interested in matchings µ ∈ M such that for all i ∈ N , µ (µ (i)) = i. To make our notation simpler, we define the following concept: Recipients i, j are mutually compatible if j has a compatible donor for i and i has a compatible donor for j. We can focus on a mutual compatibility matrix that summarizes the feasible exchanges and preferences. A mutual compatibility matrix C = [c i,j ] i∈N,j∈N is defined as for any i, j ∈ N , c i,j = 1 if i and j are mutually compatible 0 otherwise .
The induced two-way kidney exchange problem from problem (N, ) is denoted by (N, C). A subproblem of (N, C) is denoted as (I, C I ) where I ⊆ N and C I is the restriction of C to the pairs in I. Thus, all relevant information regarding preferences is summarized by the mutual compatibility matrix C.
Observe that a problem (N, C) can be represented by an undirected graph in which each recipient is a node, and there is an edge between two nodes if and only if these two recipients are mutually compatible. Hence, we define the following graph-theoretic concepts for two-way kidney exchange problems:
A problem is connected if the corresponding graph of the problem is connected, i.e., one can traverse between any two nodes of the graph using the edges of the graph. A component is a largest connected subproblem. We refer to a component as odd if it has an odd number of recipients, and as even if it has an even number of recipients.
Although in many matching domains ex-ante and ex-post efficiency are not equivalent (see e.g. The above lemma would not hold if exchange were possible among three or more recipients.
Moreover, we can state the following lemma regarding efficient lotteries:
Lemma 2 (Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver 2005a) A lottery is ex-ante efficient if and only it is ex-post efficient.
There are many Pareto-efficient matchings, and finding all of them is not computationally feasible (i.e., it is NP-complete). Therefore, we will focus on two selections of Pareto-efficient matchings and lotteries that have nice fairness features.
Priority Mechanism
In many situations, recipients may be ordered by a natural priority ordering. For example, the sensitivity of a recipient to the tissue types of others, known as panel reactive antibody (PRA), is a criterion also accepted by medical doctors. Some recipients may be sensitive to almost all tissue types other than their own and have a PRA=99%, meaning that they will reject based solely on tissue incompatibility 99% of donors from a random sample. So, one can order the recipients from high to low with respect to their PRA's and use the following priority mechanism:
Given a priority ordering of recipients, a priority mechanism matches Priority 1 recipient if she is mutually compatible with a recipient, and skips her otherwise.
. . .
matches Priority k recipient in addition to all the previously matched recipients if possible, and skips her otherwise.
Thus, the mechanism determines which recipients are to be matched first, and then one can select a Pareto-efficient matching that matches those recipients. Thus, the mechanism is only unique-valued for the utility profile induced. Any matching inducing this utility profile can be the final outcome.
The following result makes a priority mechanism very appealing:
Theorem 1 A two-way priority mechanism is Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof.
The Structure of Pareto-Efficient Matchings
We can determine additional properties Pareto-efficient matchings (even though finding all such matchings is exhaustive and hence, NP-complete) thanks to the results of Gallai (1963 Gallai ( , 1964 and Edmonds (1965) in graph theory. We can partition the recipients into three sets as
The members of these sets are defined as follows:
An underdemanded recipient is one for whom there exists a Pareto-efficient matching that leaves her unmatched. Set N U is formed by underdemanded recipients, and we will refer to this set as the set of underdemanded recipients. An overdemanded recipient is one who is not underdemanded, yet is mutually compatible with an underdemanded recipient. Set N O is formed by overdemanded recipients. A perfectly matched recipient is one who is neither underdemanded nor mutually compatible with any underdemanded recipient. Set N P is formed by perfectly matched recipients.
The following result, due to Gallai and Edmonds, is the key to understanding the structure of Pareto-efficient matchings: First, suppose that we determine the set of overdemanded recipients, N O . After removing those from the problem, we mark the recipients in odd components as underdemanded, and recipients in even components as perfectly matched. Moreover, we can think of each odd component as a single entity, which is competing to get one overdemanded recipient for its recipients under a Pareto-efficient matching.
It turns out that the sets N U , N O , N P and the GED decomposition can also be found in polynomial time thanks to Edmonds' algorithm and related results in the literature.
Egalitarian Mechanism
Recall that the utility for a recipient under a lottery is the probability of receiving a transplant.
Equalizing utilities as much as possible may be considered very desirable from an equity perspective, which is also in line with the Rawlsian notion of fairness (Rawls 1971 ). We define a central notion in Rawlsian egalitarianism:
A feasible utility profile is Lorenz-dominant if
• the least fortunate recipient receives the highest utility among all feasible utility profiles, and . . .
• the sum of utilities of the k least fortunate recipients is the highest among all feasible utility profiles.
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Is there a feasible Lorenz-dominant utility profile? Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2005a) answer this question affirmatively. This utility profile is constructed with the help of the GED of the problem. The function f is the key in constructing an egalitarian utility profile u E . The following procedure can be used to construct it:
. . as follows:
Step 1.
Step k.
) i∈N as follows:
1. For any overdemanded recipient and perfectly matched recipient i ∈ N \ N U ,
2. For any underdemanded recipient i whose odd component left the above procedure at
Step
We provide an example explaining this construction:
. . , 16} be the set of recipients and let the reduced problem be given by the graph in Figure 1 . N U = {3, . . . , 16} is the set of underdemanded recipients. Since both recipients 1 and 2 have edges with recipients in N U , N O = {1, 2} is the set of overdemanded recipients.
O 5 = {9, 10, 11}, O 6 = {12, 13, 14, 15, 16}
. Note that by the GED Lemma, an odd component that has k recipients guarantees
, none of the multi-recipient odd components is an element of O 1 . Moreover, recipient 5 has two overdemanded neighbors and
, the 5-recipient odd component O 6 is not an element of O 2 .
Moreover,
Therefore,
and u
Hence the egalitarian utility profile is
Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2005a) proved the following results:
Theorem 2 (Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver 2005a) The vector u E is a feasible utility profile.
In particular, the proof of Theorem 2 shows how a lottery that implements u E can be constructed.
Theorem 3 (Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver 2005a) The utility profile u E Lorenz-dominates any other feasible utility profile (efficient or not).
The egalitarian mechanism is a lottery mechanism that selects a lottery whose utility profile is
It is only unique-valued for the utility profile induced. As a mechanism, the egalitarian approach also has appealing properties:
Theorem 4 (Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver 2005a) The egalitarian mechanism is ex-ante efficient and strategy-proof.
The egalitarian mechanism can be used for cases in which there is no exogenous way to distinguish among recipients. In this section, a recipient will be assumed to have a single incompatible donor, and thus, the recipient and her incompatible donor will be referred to as a pair. The blood types of the recipient For simplicity in this example there is no tissue rejection between recipients and other recipients' donors.
• If only two-way exchanges are possible:
B-A); (A-A,A-A); (B-O,O-B); (AB-O,A-AB) is a possible Pareto-efficient matching.
• If three-way exchanges are also feasible: Overdemanded types:
Observe that the definitions of overdemanded and underdemanded types in this chapter are different from their definitions used in Section 4 for the GED Lemma. We will use these definitions in the next two sections as well. Both definitions are in the same flavor, yet they are not equivalent.
The first result is about the greatest lower bound of the size of two-way Pareto-efficient matchings: 
where a refers to the largest integer smaller than or equal to a and #(x-y) refers to the number of x-y type pairs.
We can generalize Example 2 in a proposition for three-way exchanges. We introduce an additional assumption for ease of notation. The symmetric case implies replacing types "A" with "B" and "B"
with "A" in all of the following results.
Assumption 3 #(A-B) > #(B-A).
The following is a simplifying assumption. When the number of A-B type pairs is larger than the number of B-A type pairs in a static pool (Assumption 3):
• All B-A type pairs can be matched with A-B type pairs in two-way exchanges.
• Each B-O type pair can potentially save one O-A type pair and one excess A-B type pair in a three-way exchange.
• Each AB-A type pair can potentially save one excess A-B type and one B-AB type pair in a three-way exchange (see Figure 3 ). Matchings: For any recipient population for which Assumptions 1-4 hold, the maximum number of recipients who can be matched with two-way and three-way exchanges is:
(#(A-O) + #(B-O) + #(AB-O) + #(AB-A) + #(AB-B)) + (#(A-B) + #(B-A) − |#(A-B) − #(B-A)|) + (#(A-A) + #(B-B) + #(O-O) + #(AB-AB)) + #(AB-O) + min{(#(A-B) − #(B-A)), (#(B-O) + #(AB-A))}
And to summarize, the marginal effect of availability of 2&3-way kidney exchanges over two-way exchanges is: What about the marginal effect of 2&3&4-way exchanges over 2&3-way exchanges? It turns out that there is only a slight improvement in the maximal matching size with the possibility of four-way exchanges.
We illustrate this using the above example: recipients who can be matched with two-way, three-way, and four-way exchanges is:
Therefore, in the absence of tissue-type incompatibilities between recipients and other recipients' donors, the marginal effect of four-way kidney exchanges is bounded from above by the rate of the very rare AB-O type.
It turns out that under the above assumptions, larger exchanges do not help to match more recipients. This is stated as follows:
Theorem 5 (Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver 2007) Availability of Four-Way Exchange Suffices: Consider a recipient population for which Assumptions 1, 2, 4 hold and let µ be any maximal matching (when there is no restriction on the size of the exchanges). Then there exists a maximal matching ν that consists only of two-way, three-way, and four-way exchanges, under which the same set of recipients benefits from exchange as in matching µ.
What about incentives, when these maximal solution concepts are adopted in a kidney exchange mechanism? The strategic properties of multi-way kidney exchange mechanisms are inspected by Hatfield (2005) in the 0-1 preference domain. This result is a generalization of Theorem 1.
A deterministic kidney exchange mechanism is consistent if whenever it only selects a multi-way matching in set X ⊆ M as its outcome, where all matchings in X generate the same utility profile when the set of feasible individually rational matchings is M, then for any other problem for the same set of pairs such that the set of feasible individually rational matchings is N ⊂ M with X ∩ N = ∅, it selects a multi-way matching in set X ∩ N .
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A deterministic mechanism is non-bossy if whenever one recipient manipulates her preferences/number of donors and cannot change her outcome, defined as either being matched to a compatible donor or remaining unmatched, then she cannot change other recipients' outcome under this mechanism with the same manipulation.
The last result of this section is as follows:
If a deterministic mechanism is non-bossy and strategy-proof then it is consistent. Moreover, a consistent mechanism is strategy-proof.
Thus, it is straightforward to create strategy-proof mechanisms using maximal -priority or priority multi-way exchange rules. By maximal-priority mechanisms, we mean mechanisms that maximize the number of patients matched (under an exchange restriction such as 2, 3, 4, etc., or no exchange size restriction) and then use a priority criterion to select among such matchings.
Simulations Using National Recipient Characteristics
In this section we dispense with the simplifying assumptions made so far, and turn to simulated data reflecting national recipient characteristics. Specifically, we now look at populations in which a recipient may have tissue type incompatibilities with many donors. This will allow us to assess the accuracy of the approximations derived under the above assumption that exchange is limited only by blood-type incompatibilities. That is, the upper bounds on the maximal number of exchanges when exchange is limited only by blood-type incompatibility are not far above the numbers of exchanges that can actually be realized.
In addition, only a small number of exchanges involving more than four pairs are needed to achieve efficiency in the simulated data.
Recipient-Donor Population Construction
We consider samples of non-blood-related recipient-donor pairs to avoid complications due to the impact of genetics on immunological incompatibilities. The characteristics such as the blood-types of recipients and donors, the PRA distribution of the recipients, donor relation of recipients, and the gender of the recipients are generated using the empirical distributions of the data from an OPTN subsidiary in the US, the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) (see Table 1 ). We consider all ethnicity in the data. In our simulations, we randomly simulate a series of recipient-donor pairs using the population characteristics explained above. Whenever a pair is compatible (both blood-type compatible and tissue-type compatible), the donor can directly donate to the intended recipient and therefore we do not include them in our sample. Only when they are either blood-type or tissue-type incompatible do we keep them, until we reach a sample size of n incompatible pairs. We use a Monte-Carlo simulation size of 500 random population constructions for three population sizes of 25, 50, and 100.
Tissue-Type Incompatibility
Tissue-type incompatibility (a positive crossmatch) is independent of blood-type incompatibility and arises when a recipient has preformed antibodies against a donor tissue-type.
Recipients in the OPTN/SRTR database are divided into the following three groups based on the odds that they have a crossmatch with a random donor: Frequencies of low, medium, and high PRA recipients reported in the OPTN/SRTR database are given in Table 1 . Since a more detailed PRA distribution is unavailable in the medical literature, we will simply assume that:
• each low PRA recipient has a positive crossmatch probability of 5 percent with a random donor,
• each medium PRA recipient has a positive crossmatch probability of 45 percent with a random donor, and
• each high PRA recipient has a positive crossmatch probability of 90 percent with a random donor.
We have already indicated that when the recipient is female and the potential donor is her husband, it is more likely that they have a positive crossmatch due to pregnancies. Zenios, Woodle, and Ross (2001) indicate that while positive crossmatch probability is 11.1 percent between random pairs, it is 33.3 percent between female recipients and their donor husbands. Equivalently, female recipients' negative crossmatch probability (i.e. the odds that there is no tissue-type incompatibility) with their husbands is approximately 75 percent of the negative crossmatch probability with a random donor. Therefore, we accordingly adjust the positive crossmatch probability between a female recipient and her donor husband using the formula PRA * = 100 − 0.75(100 − PRA) and assume that
• each low PRA female recipient has a positive crossmatch probability of 28.75 percent with her husband,
• each medium PRA female recipient has a positive crossmatch probability of 58.75 percent with her husband, and
• each high PRA female recipient has a positive crossmatch probability of 92.25 percent with her husband.
Outline of the Simulations
For each sample of n incompatible recipient-donor pairs, we find the maximum number of recipients who can benefit from an exchange when both blood-type and tissue-type incompatibilities are considered, and a. only two-way exchanges are allowed, b. two-way and three-way exchanges are allowed, c. two-way, three-way, and four-way exchanges are allowed, and d. any size exchange is allowed.
In our simulations, to find the maximal number of recipients who can benefit from an exchange when only two-way exchanges are allowed, we use a version of Edmonds' (1965) algorithm (see Roth,
Sönmez, andÜnver 2005a), and to find the maximal number of recipients who can benefit from an exchange when larger exchanges are allowed, we use various integer programming techniques.
We compare these numbers with those implied by the analytical expressions in the above propositions, to see whether those formulas are close approximations or merely crude upper-bounds. Since many high PRA recipients cannot be part of any exchange due to tissue-type incompatibilities, we report two sets of upper-bounds induced by the formulas we developed:
1. For each sample we use the formulas with the raw data, and 2. for each sample we restrict our attention to recipients each of whom can participate in at least one feasible exchange.
That is, in Table 2 , "Upper bound 1" for each maximal allowable size exchange is the formula developed above for that size exchange (i.e. Propositions 1, 2, and 3 for maximal exchange sizes 2, 3, or 4 pairs) with the population size of n = 25, 50, or 100. However, in a given sample of size n = 25, for example, there may be some recipients who have no compatible donor because of tissue-type incompatibilities, and hence cannot possibly participate in an exchange. In this population there is therefore a smaller number n < n of pairs actually available for exchange, and "Upper bound 2"
in Table 2 reports the average over all populations for the formulas using this smaller population of incompatible recipient-donor pairs. Clearly Upper bound 2 provides a more precise (i.e. lower)
upper bound to the number of exchanges that can be found. The fact that the difference between the two upper bounds diminishes as the population size increases reflects that, in larger populations, even highly sensitized recipients are likely to find a compatible donor.
Discussion of the Simulation Results
The static simulation results (which include tissue-type incompatibilities) are very similar to the theoretical upper-bounds we develop for the case with only blood-type incompatibilities. While twoway exchanges account for most of the potential gains from exchange, the number of recipients who benefit from exchange significantly increases when three or more pair exchanges are allowed, and, consistent with the theory, three-way exchanges account for a large share of the remaining potential gains. For example, for a population size of 25 pairs, an average of:
• 11.99 pairs can be matched when any size exchange is feasible,
• 11.27 pairs can be matched when only two-way and three-way exchange are feasible, and
• 8.86 pairs can be matched when only two-way exchange is feasible.
Hence for n = 25, two-way exchanges account for 74 percent (i.e. ) of the potential gains from exchange whereas three-way exchanges account for 77 percent (i.e. are achieved with two-way, three-way, and four-way exchanges, especially when the population size is large (see Table 2 ). 12 
Dynamic Kidney Exchange
The above two models consider a static situation when there is a pool of recipients with their directed incompatible donors. These models answer how we can organize kidney exchanges in an efficient and incentive-compatible way.
However, in real life, the recipient pool is not static but evolves over time. Awasthi and Sandholm (2009) consider an online mechanism design approach to find optimal dynamic mechanisms for kidney exchange when there are no waiting costs but pairs can exit the pool randomly. They look at mechanisms that are obtained heuristically by sampling future possibilities depending on the current and past matches. Their model has a very large state space; thus, online sampling is used to simplify the optimization problem.
Exchange Pool Evolution
We continue withÜnver's (2010) model. For any pair type X-Y ∈ T , let q X-Y be the probability of a random pair being of type X-Y. We refer to q X-Y as the arrival probability of pair type X-Y ∈ T .
We have X-Y ∈T q X-Y = 1.
Once a pair arrives, if it is not compatible, it becomes available for exchange. If it is compatible, the donor immediately donates a kidney to the recipient of the pair and the pair does not participate
12 When the population size is 100 incompatible pairs, in 485 of the 500 simulated populations the maximum possible gains from trade are achieved when no more than four pairs are allowed to participate in an exchange.
in exchanges. The exchange pool is the set of the pairs which have arrived over time and whose recipient has not yet received a transplant.
Let p c be the positive crossmatch probability that determines the probability that a donor and a recipient will be tissue-type incompatible. Let p X-Y denote the pool entry probability of any arriving pair type X-Y. Since blood-type incompatible pairs always join the exchange pool, we have 
Time-and Compatibility-Based Preferences
Each recipient has preferences over donors and time of waiting in the pool. For any incompatible pair i, recipient R i 's preferences are denoted by i and defined over donor-time interval pairs. Recipient For each pair, we associate waiting in the pool with a monetary cost and we assume that the unit time cost of waiting for a transplant by undergoing continuous dialysis is equal to c > 0 for each recipient. The alternative to a transplant is dialysis. A recipient can undergo dialysis continuously. 13 Let ∼ i denote the indifference relation and i denote the strict preference relation associated with the preference
It is well known that receiving a transplant causes the recipient to resume a better life (Overbeck et al. 2005 ). Also, health care costs for dialysis are higher than those for transplantation in the long term (Schweitzer et al. 1998) . We model all the costs associated with undergoing continuous dialysis by the unit time cost c.
Dynamically Efficient Mechanisms
A (dynamic) matching mechanism is a dynamic procedure such that at each time t ≥ 0 it selects a (possibly empty) matching of the pairs available in the pool. Once a pair is matched at time t by a matching mechanism, it leaves the pool and its recipient receives the assigned transplant.
Let # A (t) be the total number of pairs that have arrived until time t. If mechanism φ is executed (starting time 0), # A,φ (t) is the total number of pairs matched by mechanism φ. There are # A (t) − # A,φ (t) pairs available at the pool at time t.
There is a health authority that oversees the exchanges.
Suppose that the health authority implements a matching mechanism φ. For any time t, the current value of expected cost at time t under matching mechanism φ is given as
where ρ is the discount rate.
For any time τ, t such that τ > t, we have
, where the first term is the expected number of recipients to arrive at the exchange pool in the interval [t, τ ] and the second term is the number of recipients that arrived at the pool until time t. Therefore, we can rewrite E t C φ (t) as
Only the last term in Equation 1 depends on the choice of mechanism φ. The previous terms cannot be controlled by the health authority, since they are the costs associated with the number of recipients arriving at the pool. We refer to this last term as the exchange surplus at time t for mechanism φ and denote it by 14 E t refers to the expected value at time t.
We can rewrite it as
The first term above is the exchange surplus attributable to all exchanges that have been done until time t and at time t and the second term is the future exchange surplus attributable to the exchanges to be done in the future. The central health authority cannot control the number of past exchanges at time t either. Let n φ (τ ) be the number of matched recipients at time τ by mechanism φ, and we have
We focus on the present and future exchange surplus which is given as
A dynamic matching mechanism ν is (dynamically) efficient if for any t, it maximizes the present and future exchange surplus at time t given in Equation 2. We look for solutions of the problem independent of initial conditions and time t. We will define a steady-state formally. If such solutions exist, they depend only on the "current state of the pool" (defined appropriately) but not on time t or the initial conditions.
Dynamically Efficient Two-way Exchange
In this subsection, we derive the dynamically optimal two-way matching mechanism. Throughout this subsection we will maintain two assumptions, Assumptions 1 and 2, introduced in Section 5.
We are ready to state Theorem 7.
Theorem 7 (Ünver 2010) Let dynamic matching mechanism ν be defined as a mechanism that matches only X-Y type pairs with their reciprocal Y-X type pairs, immediately when such an exchange is feasible. Then, under Assumptions 1 and 2, mechanism ν is a dynamically optimal two-way matching mechanism.
Moreover, a dynamically optimal two-way matching mechanism conducts a two-way exchange whenever one becomes feasible.
Next we show that Assumption 2 will hold in the long run under the most reasonable pair-type arrival distributions; thus, it is not a restrictive assumption. The hypothesis of the above proposition is very mild and will hold for sufficiently small crossmatch probability. Moreover, it holds for real-life blood frequencies. For example, assuming that the recipient and the paired-donor are blood-unrelated, the arrival rates reported in the simulations section of the paper satisfy these assumptions, when the crossmatch probability is p c = 0.11, as reported by Zenios, Woodle, and Ross (2001).
Proposition 4 (Ünver

Dynamically Efficient Multi-way Exchanges
In this section, we consider matching mechanisms that allow for not only two-way exchanges, but larger exchanges as well. Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2010) have studied the importance of threeway and larger exchanges in a static environment, and we summarized these results in Section 5.
The results in this subsection follow this intuition, and are due toÜnver (2010). We can state the following observation motivated by the results in Section 5:
Observation 4 In an exchange that matches an underdemanded pair, there should be at least one overdemanded pair. In an exchange that matches a reciprocally demanded pair, there should at least be one reciprocal type pair or an overdemanded pair.
Using the above illustration, under realistic blood-type distribution assumptions, we will prove that Assumption 2 still holds, when the applied matching mechanism is unrestricted. Recall that through Assumption 2, we assumed to have arbitrarily many underdemanded type pairs available in the long-run states of the exchange pool, regardless of the dynamic matching mechanism used to achieve the long run. The hypothesis of the above proposition is also very mild and will hold for sufficiently small crossmatch probability p c . Moreover, it holds for real-life blood frequencies and crossmatch probability.
For example, assuming that the recipient and the paired-donor are blood-unrelated, the arrival rates reported in the simulations section of the paper satisfy these assumptions. Thus, we can safely use Assumption 2 in this section, as well.
Next, we characterize the dynamically efficient mechanism.
In a dynamic setting, the structure of three-way and four-way exchanges discussed above may cause the second part of Theorem 7 not to hold when these larger exchanges are feasible. More specifically, we can benefit from not conducting all feasible exchanges currently available, and holding on to some of the pairs that can currently participate in an exchange in expectation of saving more pairs in the near future.
We maintain Assumption 1 as well as Assumption 2 in this subsection. We state one other assumption. First, we state that as long as the difference between A-B and B-A type arrival frequencies
is not large, overdemanded type pairs will be matched immediately. To answer this question, we analyze the dynamic optimization problem. Since the pairs arrive according to a Poisson process, we can convert the problem to an embedded Markov decision process. We need to define a state space for our analysis. Since the pairs in each type are symmetric by Assumption 1, the natural candidate for a state is a 16-dimensional vector, which shows the number of pairs in each type available. In our exchange problem, there is additional structure to eliminate some of these state variables. We look at overdemanded, underdemanded, self-demanded, and reciprocally demanded types separately:
• Overdemanded types: If an overdemanded pair i of type X-Y ∈ T O arrives, by Proposition 6, pair i will be matched immediately in some exchange. Hence, the number of overdemanded pairs remaining in the pool is always 0.
• Underdemanded types: By Assumption 2 as well as Assumption 1, there will be an arbitrarily large number of underdemanded pairs. Hence, the number of underdemanded pairs is always ∞.
• Self-demanded types: Whenever a self-demanded pair i of type X-X ∈ T S is available in the exchange pool, it can be matched through two ways under a multi-way matching mechanism:
1. If another X-X type pair j arrives, by Assumption 1, i and j will be mutually compatible, and a two-way exchange (i, j) can be conducted.
2. If an exchange E = (i 1 , i 2 , ..., i k ), with Y blood-type donor D i k and Z blood-type recipient R i 1 , becomes feasible, and blood-type Y donors are blood-type compatible with bloodtype X recipients, while blood-type X donors are blood-type compatible with blood-type Z recipients, then pair i can be inserted in exchange E just after i k , and by Assumption 1, the new exchange E = (i 1 , i 2 , ..., i k , i) will be feasible.
By Observation 4, a self-demanded type can never save an overdemanded or reciprocally demanded pair without the help of an overdemanded or another reciprocally demanded pair.
Suppose that there are n X-X type pairs. Then, they should be matched in two-way exchanges to save 2 n 2 of them (which is possible by Assumption 1). This and the above observations imply that under a dynamically efficient matching mechanism, for any X-X ∈ T S , at steady-state there will be either 0 or 1 X-X type pair.
Therefore, in our analysis, existence of self-demanded types will be reflected by four additional state variables, each of which gets values either 0 or 1. We will derive the efficient dynamic matching mechanism by ignoring the self-demanded type pairs:
Assumption 6 (No Self-Demanded Types Assumption): There are no self-demanded types available for exchange and q X-X = 0 for all X-X ∈ T .
• Reciprocally demanded types: By the above analysis, there are no overdemanded or selfdemanded type pairs available and there are infinitely many underdemanded type pairs. Therefore, the state of the exchange pool can simply be denoted by the number of A-B type pairs and B-A type pairs. By Assumption 1, an A-B type pair and B-A type pair are mutually compatible with each other, and they can be matched in a two-way exchange. Moreover, by
Observation 4, an A-B or B-A type pair cannot save an underdemanded pair in an exchange without the help of an overdemanded pair. Hence, the most optimal use of A-B and B-A type pairs is being matched with each other in a two-way exchange. Therefore, under the optimal matching mechanism, an A-B and B-A type pair will never remain in the pool together but will be matched via a two-way exchange. By this observation, we can simply denote the state of the exchange pool by an integer s, such that if s > 0, then s refers to the number of A-B type pairs in the exchange pool, and if s < 0, then |s| refers to the number of B-A type pairs in the exchange pool. Formally s is the difference between the number of A-B type pairs and B-A type pairs in the pool, and only one of these two numbers can be non-zero. Let S = Z be the state space (i.e., the set of integers).
Markov Chain Representation
In this subsection, we characterize the transition from one state to another under a dynamically optimal matching mechanism by a Markov chain given Assumptions 1, 2, 5, and 6:
First suppose s > 0, i.e. there are some A-B type pairs and no B-A type pairs. Suppose a pair of type X-Y ∈ T becomes available. In this case, three subcases are possible for pair i: of exchanges that can be conducted: a two-way exchange and a three-way exchange:
• By Assumption 2, there is a mutually compatible pair j of type Y-X, and (i, j) is a feasible two-way exchange.
• If X-Y = B-O: By Assumption 2, there is an arbitrary number of O-A type pairs. Let pair j be an O-A type pair. Let k be an A-B type pair in the pool. By Assumption 2, (i, j, k) is a feasible three-way exchange (see Figure 3) .
If X-Y = AB-A: By Assumption 2, there is an arbitrary number of B-AB type pairs.
Let k be a B-AB type pair. Let j be an A-B type pair in the pool. By Assumption 1, (i, j, k) is a feasible three-way exchange.
Let action a 1 refer to conducting a smaller exchange (i.e., two-way), and action a 2 refer to conducting a larger exchange (i.e., three-way). If action a 1 is chosen, 2 pairs are matched, and the state of the pool does not change. If action a 2 is chosen, then 3 pairs are matched, and the state of the pool decreases to s − 1.
(c) X-Y = AB-O: Since s > 0, there are three types of exchanges that can be conducted: a two-way exchange, a three-way exchange, or a four-way exchange:
• By Assumption 2 and Observation 1, for any W-Z ∈ T U , there is a mutually compatible pair j of type W-Z for pair i. Hence, (i, j) is a feasible two-way exchange.
• By Assumption 2, there are pair j of type O-B and pair k of type B-AB such that (i, j, k) is a feasible three-way exchange. Also by Assumption 2, there are pair g of type O-A and pair h of type A-AB such that (g, h, i) is a feasible three way-exchange (see Figure 2a ,b). By Assumption 2, there is an arbitrarily large number of underdemanded pairs independent of the matching mechanism, therefore, conducting either of these two three-way exchanges has the same effect on the future states of the pool. Hence, we will not distinguish these two types of exchanges.
• By Assumptions 1 and 2, a pair h of type B-AB, a pair j of type O-A, and a pair k of type A-B form the four-way exchange (h, i, j, k) with pair i (see Figure 4 ).
Two-way and three-way exchanges do not change the state of the pool. Therefore, conducting a three-way exchange dominates conducting a two-way exchange. Hence, under the optimal mechanism, we rule out conducting a two-way exchange, when an AB-O type pair arrives. Let action a 1 refer to conducting a smaller (i.e., three-way) exchange, and let action a 2 refer to conducting a larger (i.e., four-way) exchange. If action a 1 is chosen, Note that we do not need to distinguish decisions regarding two-way versus three-way exchanges and three-way versus four-way exchanges. We denote all actions regarding smaller exchanges by a 1 and all actions regarding larger exchanges by a 2 . Since the difference between a smaller exchange and a larger exchange is always one pair, i.e., an A-B type pair, whenever the state of the pool dictates that a three-way exchange is chosen instead of a two-way exchange when a B-O or AB-A type pair arrives, then it will also dictate that a four-way exchange will be chosen instead of a three-way exchange when an AB-O type pair arrives. 
The Dynamically Efficient Multi-way Matching Mechanism
A (deterministic) Markov matching mechanism φ is a matching mechanism that chooses the same action whenever the Markov chain is in the same state. In our reduced state and action problem, a Markov matching mechanism chooses either action a 1 , conducting the smaller exchange, or action a 2 , conducting the largest exchange, at each state, except state 0. The remaining choices of the Markov mechanism are straightforward: It chooses a maximal exchange when such an exchange becomes feasible (for negative states by interchanging the roles of A and B blood types as outlined in the previous subsection). Formally, φ : S → {a 1 , a 2 } is a Markov matching mechanism.
Next we define a class of Markov matching mechanisms. A Markov matching mechanism φ s,s :
S → {a 1 , a 2 } is a threshold matching mechanism with thresholds s ≥ 0 and s ≤ 0, if Next, we specify the optimal mechanism more precisely.
Theorem 9 (Ünver 2010) Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 5, and 6 hold. Then,
• If q A-B ≥ q B-A , that is, A-B type arrives at least as frequently as B-A type, and
, that is, the types that can match A-B type pairs in larger exchanges arrive less frequently than those for the B-A type, then φ 0,s * is the dynamically efficient multi-way matching mechanism for some s * ≤ 0.
• If q A-B = q B-A and q B-O + q AB-A = q A-O + q AB-B , then φ 0,0 is the dynamically efficient multi-way matching mechanism. That is, maximal size exchanges are conducted whenever they become feasible.
• If q A-B ≤ q B-A and q B-O + q AB-A > q A-O + q AB-B , then φ s * ,0 is the dynamically efficient multi-way matching mechanism for some s * ≥ 0.
According to the arrival frequencies reported in Table 1, for pairs forming between random donors and recipients, we expect the mechanism reported in the first bullet-point to be the efficient mechanism.
Concluding Remarks
We conclude our survey by surveying other topics that have attracted the attention of researchers and practitioners alike.
Computational Issues
Following Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2007), one can write an integer program to solve the maximal kidney exchange problem.
We give the explicit formulation of finding the maximal number of patients who can benefit from two-way and up to k-way exchanges for any number k such that |N | ≥ k ≥ 2.
pate. Let |E| be the number of transplants possible under E; hence we have |E| = k.
Let E k be the set of feasible two-way through k-way exchanges possible among the pairs in N .
For any pair i, let E k (i) denote the set of exchanges in E k such that pair i can participate. Let x = (x E ) E∈E k be a vector of 0s and 1s such that x E = 1 denotes that exchange E is going to be conducted, and x E = 0 denotes that exchange E is not going to be conducted. Our problem of finding a maximal set of patients who will benefit from two-way,..., and k-way exchanges is given by the following integer program:
This problem is solved using Edmonds' (1965) algorithm for k = 2 (i.e., only for two-way exchanges) in polynomial time. However, for k ≥ 3 this problem is NP-complete. We also formulate the following version of the integer programming problem, which does not require ex-ante construction of the sets E k :
Let C * = c * i,j i∈N,j∈N be a matrix of 0s and 1s such that if Recipient R i is compatible with Donor D j we have c * i,j = 1 and if R i is not compatible with donor D j we have c * i,j = 0. Let X = [x i,j ] i∈N,j∈N be the assignment matrix of 0s and 1s such that x i,j = 1 denotes that recipient R i receives a kidney from donor D j and x i,j = 0 denotes that recipient R i does not receive a kidney from donor D j under the proposed assignment X. We solve the following integer program to find a maximal set of two-way,...,and k-way exchanges: max X i∈N,j∈N
subject to
A solution of this problem determines a maximal set of patients who can benefit from two-way,..., and k-way exchanges for any k < |N |. A maximal set of patients who can benefit from unrestricted exchanges is found by setting k = |N |. In this case Constraint 7 becomes redundant. This formulation is used to find the maximal set of unrestricted multi-way exchanges.
Since the problems are NP-complete for k > 2, there is no known algorithm that runs in worstcase time that is polynomial in the size of the input. Simulations have shown that for more than a certain number of pairs in the exchange pool, commercial integer programming software programs have difficulty solving these optimization problems. Abraham, Blum, and Sandholm (2007) proposed a tailored integer programming algorithm designed specifically to solve large kidney exchange problems. 16 This algorithm increases the scalability of a computable problem size considerably more than commercial integer programming software capabilities and can solve the problem optimally in less than 2 hours at the full projected scale of the nationwide kidney exchange (10,000 pairs). The US national kidney exchange program whose pilot runs started to be conducted in the late 2010 uses this 16 There is also a recent strand of literature that deals with different computability issues under various solution tailored algorithm, while some regional programs continue to use commercial integer programming software versions of the computational implementation.
List Exchange Chains
Another concept that is being implemented in NEPKE is that of list exchange chains (Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver 2004; see also Roth et al. 2007) . A k−way list exchange chain is similar to a k−way paired kidney exchange, with the exception that one of the pairs in the exchange is a virtual pair with the property that
• the donor of this pair is a priority on the deceased donor waiting list, i.e., whomever is assigned this donor gets priority to receive the next incoming deceased donor kidney; and
• the recipient of this pair is the highest-priority recipient who is waiting for a kidney on the deceased donor waiting list.
Thus, in a list exchange chain, one recipient of a pair receives a priority to receive the next incoming compatible deceased donor kidney (by trading her own paired live donor's kidney); and one donor of a pair in the exchange does not donate to anybody in the exchange pool but donates to the top-priority recipient waiting for a deceased donor kidney.
A three-way list exchange chain. Here r refers to the recipient on the deceased donor waiting list and w refers to priority on the deceased donor waiting list.
There are two ethical concerns regarding list exchanges in the medical community; therefore, not all regions implement it (Ross et al. 1997, Ross and Woodle 2000) .
The first concern regards the imbalance between the blood type of the recipient at the top of the waiting list who receives a kidney and the recipient in the exchange pool who receives top priority on the waiting list. Because of blood-type compatibility requirements, most of the time the recipient who gets a live-donor kidney will be of an inferior type, such as AB, A, or B, while the recipient who is sent to the top of the waiting list will be of O blood-type. Thus, this will increase the waiting time for O blood-type patients on the waiting list.
The second concern regards the inferior quality of deceased-donor kidneys compared to live-donor kidneys. Many medical doctors are not willing to leave such a decision to patients, i.e., whether to exchange a live-donor kidney for a deceased-donor kidney.
Altruistic Donor Chains
A new form of exchange is finding many applications in the field. In a year, there are about 100 altruistic donors, live-donors who are willing to donate one of their kidneys to a stranger, in the US.
Such donations are not regulated and traditionally have been treated like deceased-donor donations.
However, a recent paradigm suggests that an altruistic donor can donate to a pair in the exchange pool, and in return this pair can donate to another pair, ..., and finally the last pair donates to the top-priority recipient on the waiting list. This is referred to as a simultaneous altruistic donor chain (Montgomery et al. 2006 ; see also Roth et al. 2007 ).
A simultaneous three-way altruistic donor chain. Here D * refers to the altruistic donor and r refers to a recipient on the top of the deceased donor waiting list.
Thus, instead of an altruistic donor helping a single recipient on the waiting list, he helps k recipients in a k−way closed altruistic donor chain.
A newer paradigm takes this idea one step forward. Instead of the last donor immediately donating a kidney to a recipient on the waiting list, he becomes a bridge donor, i.e., he acts as an altruistic donor and may help a future incoming pair to the exchange. The problem with this approach is that the bridge donor can opt out from future donation after his paired-recipient receives a kidney.
However, field experimentation suggests that in APD no bridge donor has backed out yet in any of A non-simultaneous two-way altruistic donor chain. Here, D * refers to the altruistic donor, and D 2 is the bridge donor who will act as an altruistic donor in a future altruistic donor chain.
The potential impact of altruistic donor chains is quite large. For example, in APD, 22 transplantations were conducted through 6 non-simultaneous altruistic donor chains in 10 states, all with active bridge donors (at the time this manuscript was drafted).
Exchange with Compatible Pairs
Currently, compatible pairs are not part of the kidney exchange paradigm, since the recipient of the pair receives directly a kidney from her paired-donor. Woodle and Ross (1998) proposed compatible pairs to be included in kidney exchanges, since they will contribute to a substantial increase in the number of transplants from exchanges. Indeed, the simulations by Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2005b) show that when compatible pairs are used in exchanges, since the pairs will likely be of overdemanded types, they will increase the gains from exchange tremendously (also see Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver (2004)). Table 3 shows the results of this simulation for efficient two-way exchange mechanisms.
This table shows the dramatic potential impact of including compatible pairs in exchange. When list exchange is not possible for n = 100, about 70% of the pairs receive a kidney when only incompatible pairs participate in exchange. This number increases to 91% when compatible pairs also participate in exchange.
Sönmez andÜnver (2010), the authors of this survey, model the two-way kidney exchange problem with compatible pairs. We obtain favorable graph-theoretical results analogous to the problem without compatible pairs (see Roth, Sönmez, andÜnver 2005a) . We show that the latter is a special case of the former general model and extend the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition to this domain.
We introduce an algorithm that finds a Pareto-efficient matching with polynomial time and space requirements. We generalize the most economically relevant results and the priority mechanisms to this domain. Moreover, our results generalize to a domain that includes altruistic donors that are incorporated through simultaneous two-way chains.
False-Negative Crossmatches
Detection of tissue-type incompatibility without a crossmatch test is not a perfect science. Since this test, which involves mixing blood samples from the donor and the recipient, is expensive to conduct between all donors and recipients, exchange programs usually rely on a different method to determine whether a donor is tissue-type compatible with a recipient. Using a simple antibody test, doctors determine the HLA proteins that trigger antibodies in a recipient. Also taking into account the previous rejection and sensitivity history of the recipient, they determine the HLA proteins that are compatible (or incompatible) with her. Hence, the donors who have the compatible (or incompatible)
HLAs are deemed tissue-type compatible (or incompatible) with the recipient. However, this test has a flow: the false-negative crossmatch (false tissue-type compatibility) rate is sometimes high. As a result, some exchanges found by the matching mechanism do not go through. Such cases affect the whole match, since different outcomes could have been found if these incompatibilities had been taken into account. Large kidney exchange programs with an extended history can partially avoid this problem, since many actual crossmatch tests have already been conducted between many donors Table 3 : A Pareto-efficient two-way exchange mechanism outcome for n pairs randomly generated using national population characteristics (including compatible and incompatible pairs) when compatible pairs are in/out of exchange, when n = 25/100, when list exchanges are impossible/possible and 40% of the pairs are willing to use this option. Own refers to the patients receiving their owndonor kidneys (i.e., when compatible pairs are out, this is the number of compatible pairs generated in the population). Exchange refers to the number of patients who receive a kidney through exchange.
w-List refers to the number of patients who get priority on the waiting list when list exchange is possible.
and recipients over the years. They can simply use this data in matching instead of the simple test results. Morrill (2008) introduces a mechanism for the two-way matching problem (aka roommates problem) to find a Pareto-efficient matching starting from a Pareto-inefficient matching. His model's preference domain is strict preferences. An application of this mechanism is as follows: after a set of kidney exchanges are fixed, if some of these fail to go through for some reason, we can use Morrill's mechanism to find a matching that Pareto-dominates the initial one. This mechanism has a novel polynomial time algorithm that synthesizes the intuition from Gale's top-trading cycles algorithm (used to find the core for strict preferences with unrestricted multi-way exchanges) with Edmonds' algorithm (used to find a Pareto-efficient matching for 0-1 preferences with two-way exchanges).
Transplant Center Incentives
Transplant centers decide voluntarily whether to participate in a larger exchange program, such as the APD or the forthcoming national program. Moreover, if they do, they are free to determine which recipients of their center will be matched through the larger program. Thus, centers can strategically decide which of their patients will be matched through the larger program. If centers care about maximizing the number of recipients to be matched through exchanges, the following result shows that no efficient mechanism is immune to manipulation: • The pair that does not receive a transplant is in Center A. In this case, if Center A does not submit pairs a 1 and a 2 to the centralized match, and instead matches them internally to each other, then there is a single multi-center Pareto-efficient matching {(a 3 , b 4 ), (b 2 , b 4 )}, and φ chooses this matching. As a result, Center A succeeds in matching its all three pairs.
• The pair that does not receive a transplant is in Center B. In this case, if Center B does not submit pairs b 3 and b 4 to the centralized match, and instead matches them internally to each other, then there is a single multi-center Pareto-efficient matching {(a 1 , b 1 ) , (a 2 , b 2 )}, and φ chooses this matching. As a result, Center B succeeds in matching its all four pairs.
In either case, we showed that there is a center that can successfully manipulate the Paretoefficient multi-center matching mechanism φ.
Future research in this area involves finding mechanisms that have good incentive and efficiency properties for centers, using different solution and modeling concepts. A recent example of this line of research is by Ashlagi and Roth (2011) , who investigate the participation problem using computer science techniques for large populations.
